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INTRODUCTION  
This article will examine the rise of nationalism amongst young Russians in post-Soviet 
Russian society. The aim is to analyse the causes of this development amongst two particular 
groups of young Russians, namely the Russian skinhead movement and the political youth 
movement Nashi. As well as looking into the causes of the rise of nationalism amongst these 
particular groups, this article will also look at the impact these groups have had in the further 
spread of nationalism throughout Russian society. 
 It will be argued that the skinhead movement first emerged as a symptom of wider 
changes throughout Russian society following the collapse of communism, being part of a 
general rise in nationalistic and xenophobic attitudes amongst the wider population; 
meanwhile, Nashi actively co-opted nationalists and attempted to use nationalism as a tool 
for its own devices. Acknowledging the general rise in far-right attitudes, Nashi attempted 
to control them, but in fact predominantly resulted in their spread. In addition, the close 
ties of Nashi to Putin’s government could not help but dictate the actions of the group, 
meaning that it was pressured into following the government’s equally ambiguous approach 
towards Russian nationalism. Finally, the two groups shall be compared, and it will be 
argued that in recent years the skinhead movement has become increasingly political, and 
that although it was initially composed of groups of dissatisfied Russian teenagers, it has 
become a political force in its own right, further disseminating far-right nationalism 
amongst wider Russian society. In this respect, it will be argued that it is the lack of action 
on the part of the government which is to a great extent responsible for allowing this 
upsurge in far-right political activity, which has also lead to some cooperation between 
skinheads and Nashi. 
 There has been a large increase in nationalistic and xenophobic attitudes amongst 
Russian youth, and Russians in general, since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In addition, 
107 WALES – SKINHEADS AND NASHI: WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR THE RISE OF 
NATIONALISM AMONGST RUSSIAN YOUTH IN THE POST-SOVIET PERIOD? 
© School of Slavonic and Eastern European Studies, University College London, 2016. 
under Putin nationalism has become a conspicuous political and social force. As Marlène 
Laurelle writes, ‘Russian society [...] has been saturated with the slogan “Russia for the 
Russians...”’1 This is well exemplified by the vicious race riots that broke out on Manezh 
Square in Moscow on December 11 2010. Following the murder of a Spartak Moscow 
Football Club fan by a group of assailants allegedly from the Caucasus, several days of riots 
broke out with much of the violence directed against Moscow’s immigrant population, 
resulting in the deaths of two men and the hospitalisation of more than 20 others.2 As Will 
Englund reported at the time: 
 
Street melees here over the past few days, sparked by the killing of a soccer fan and 
fueled by nationalists’ hatred of immigrants from the Caucasus, have caught the police 
and other authorities unprepared for an upsurge of rage that appears to reflect a larger 
sense of anger in Russian society.3 
 
This is just one example of many racially-motivated violent events which have taken place 
in Russia in recent years, and given this underlying sense of anger, it is important to 
understand why there has been an increase in far-right nationalism amongst young Russians. 
It is according to their beliefs and values that the direction Russia takes in the future will 
ultimately be dictated. Given the popularity of nationalism in Russia at the time of writing, 
this sort of far-right ideology could have a large impact on the future of this deeply 
multiethnic and multicultural country.  
 Both the Russian skinhead movement and Nashi have received large amounts of 
national and international media attention, providing a wealth of primary sources online 
regarding both groups. In addition, I have drawn on a range of journal articles and books. 
A key inspiration for this article has been the work of Hilary Pilkington, Elena Omel’chenko 
and Al’bina Garifzianova, who have written much on youth in Russian society from the late 
1980s onwards. It is hoped that this dissertation can contribute to the ongoing discussion 
on the issue of nationalism amongst young people in contemporary Russian society by 
providing a side-by-side analysis and comparison of both the skinhead movement and 
                                                        
1 Marlène Laruelle, In the Name of the Nation: Nationalism and Politics in Contemporary Russia, (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) p.39. 
2 Miriam Elder, ‘Two Dead as far-right football fans riot in Moscow’, The Guardian, 13 December 2010, 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/13/two-dead-football-racist-riot-moscow> [accessed 29 
March 2015] (paras. 1-3 of 15). 
3 Will Englund, ‘Riots in Russia rooted in nationalism, hatred of immigrants’, Washington Post, 14 December 
2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/13/AR2010121305794.html> 
[accessed 29 March 2015] (para. 1 of 16). 
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Nashi. While the relationship between these groups has been discussed in existing academic 
works, to the best of my knowledge there is no scholarly work as yet comparing and 
contrasting them. 
 It is also important to define what is meant by the term ‘nationalism’, as used here. 
Nationalism itself is defined by Lloyd A. Fallers as ‘an ideological commitment to the 
pursuit of unity, independence, and interests of a people who conceive themselves as 
forming a community.’4 It is that part of a certain ‘culture which is actively and explicitly 
concerned with the establishment and defense of patterns of value and belief.’5 In the 
Russian case, nationalism ‘spans a large social spectrum stretching from the racist violence 
of skinheads and the population’s massive but vague xenophobia, to the elite’s affirmation 
of cultural and material satisfaction and the middle classes’ beliefs in a better future.’6 It 
would appear, then, that nationalism does not mean the same thing to all people. However, 
for the purposes of this dissertation the main focus will be on the sort of nationalism that 
lies at the more extreme end of this spectrum. 
I. THE RISE OF THE SKINHEADS 
The Russian skinhead phenomenon started as a small subcultural movement in the early 
1990s, consisting mostly of teenagers mimicking the style and actions of their western 
counterparts.7 This was symptomatic of a more general trend which encompassed many 
different youth movements and subcultures following the collapse of the Soviet Union. As 
the walls of the USSR collapsed, residents of the Russian Federation found themselves 
more exposed than they had ever been to different Western styles and trends which the 
Soviet state had, throughout its entire existence, either attempted to control strictly or to 
ban outright. During the 1990s and 2000s the number of skinheads grew greatly, leading to 
its current state as a particularly popular far-right subcultural movement. 
                                                        
4 Lloyd A. Fallers, ‘Ideology and Culture in Uganda Nationalism’, American Anthropologist, 63.4 (1961) 
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1525/aa.1961.63.4.02a00010/abstract> [accessed 30 March 2015] 
(p.677). 
5 Ibid., pp. 677-678. 
6 Laruelle, p.13. 
7 Hilary Pilkington, ‘Introduction: Rethinking skinhead lives’, in Russia’s Skinheads: Exploring and Rethinking 
Subcultural Lives, ed. by Hilary Pilkington, Elena Omel’chenko and Al’bina Garifzianova, (London and NY: 
Routledge, 2010) pp. 1-22 (p.5).  
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 According to an estimate from the Russian Interior Ministry press service, by 2007 
the number of skinheads in Russia numbered over 100,000.8 From 2008 onwards Russia 
experienced a decline in racially motivated street violence as a result of increased 
government efforts to suppress extremist right-wing groups, particularly in the Moscow 
region.9 Despite this decrease, more recently there has been a noticeable resurgence in 
skinhead activity, and experts on Russian nationalism at the SOVA Centre for Information 
and Analysis have predicted that there could be a possible increase in skinhead activity in 
the coming years as Russian extremist nationalists return from fighting in the recent conflict 
in Ukraine.10 This follows an increase in racially motivated violence noticed in 2013, seen as 
a result of an anti-migrant policy put in place by the authorities which rallied against ‘ethnic 
crime’, receiving a large amount of media attention and public support.11 By the end of 2013 
‘the decline in street racist violence, which lasted from 2009 to 2012, evidently came to an 
end.’12 Given the size of the Russian skinhead movement and its impact upon Russian 
society, it is important to consider the role of nationalism in the beliefs and actions of those 
who ascribe themselves to it. 
 Overt nationalism seems to come part and parcel with skinhead ideology, but it is 
important to deconstruct this preconception and ascertain to what extent nationalism drives 
and motivates the actions of these individuals, and what the foundations and reasons are 
for these beliefs. As well as having an overtly nationalistic agenda, their ideology 
encompasses more than just patriotic feelings towards the Russian nation. Russian 
skinheads have famously committed a large number of violent crimes against foreigners in 
Russia, claiming to be protecting the Russian nation by attacking immigrants, foreign 
students and Russian citizens who are not ethnically Russian. In addition, skinheads have 
been known to attack members of different subcultures, such as punks and hip-hop fans, 
and increasingly in recent years there has been an upsurge in attacks against LGBT Russians 
                                                        
8 Ibid., p.9. 
9 Galina Kozhevnikova, ‘Under the Sign of Political Terror. Radical Nationalism and Efforts to Counteract 
It in 2009’, The SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, (2010) <http://www.sova-
center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/2010/03/d18151/> [accessed 17 February 2015] (para. 2 of 
172). 
10 Natalia Yudina, ‘Beware the Rise of the Russian Ultra-Right’, The SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, 
(2014) <http://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/2014/09/d30212/> [accessed 17 
February 2015] (para. 20 of 20). 
11 Natalia Yudina and Vera Alperovich, ‘The Ultra-Right Shrugged: Xenophobia and Radical Nationalism in 
Russia, and Efforts to Counteract Them in 2013’, The SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, (2014) 
<http://www.sova-center.ru/en/xenophobia/reports-analyses/2014/03/d29236/> [accessed 19 February 
2015] (paras.4-6 of 223). 
12  Ibid., para. 2. 
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committed by skinheads and neo-nazis.13 Whilst skinheads direct much of their violent 
action against foreigners, they also simply target those they consider unusual – perhaps a 
contemporary manifestation of groups from the late Soviet period such as the liubery. 
 Members of the liubery came from the town of Liubertsy, located 20 kilometres 
south-east of Moscow, whose culture can be characterised as valuing physical strength and 
strongly opposing western subcultures, such as punks and hippies.14 They would often 
travel to Moscow ‘in order to beat up those of their contemporaries who did not meet their 
approval.’15 Like that of skinheads, their fashion style was characteristically working class.16 
Here we find obvious similarities between the liubery and skinheads, being overtly macho, 
distinctively working class and having a distaste for different western styles and subcultures. 
These are all attributes which constitute part of the skinhead identity whilst not being 
intrinsically nationalistic. As Alexander Tarasov notes, many of the first skinheads in Russia 
were not necessarily racist or nationalistic, but rather following a trend.17 
 It is undeniable, though, that nationalism and xenophobic attitudes play a strong 
role in skinhead ideology. In their study of one small group of skinheads in a northern 
Russian city, Omel’chenko and Garifzianova found that the xenophobic attitudes of many 
of those within this particular group had been influenced by a ‘general xenophobic 
background.’ 18  This background was particularly important, and as Omel’chenko and 
Garifzianova note:  
 
for many of the young people choosing a skinhead subcultural identity, their xenophobic 
attitudes have been shaped by authoritarian adults - parents who frequently spoke 
negatively about ‘non-Russians’ - or by friends who had come in to the movement 
earlier.19  
 
                                                        
13 Nikolai P. Kovalev, ‘Jury Trials for Violent Hate Crimes in Russia: Is Russian Justice Only For Ethnic 
Russians?’ (2011), Criminology, Paper 4 <http://scholars.wlu.ca/brantford_cc/4> [accessed 19 February 
2015] pp.669-736 (p.670). 
14 Hilary Pilkington, Russia’s Youth and its Culture: A Nation’s Constructors and its Constructed, (London: 
Routledge, 1994) p.142. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., p.225. 
17 Alexander Tarasov, ‘Porozhdenie Reform: Britogolvie, oni zhe Skinhedy’, Svobodnaya Mysl- XXI, 4-5 
(2000) Para. 30-31. 
18 Elena Omel’chenko and Al’bina Garifzianova, ‘Skinheads as Defenders of Russia? Power versus 
Friendship in Xenophobic Youth Subcultures’, in Subcultures and New Religious Movements in Russia and East-
Central Europe, ed. by George McKay et al. (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2009) p.54. 
19 Ibid. 
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The social, political and economic turmoil of the 1990s left many young Russians with far 
less support than they had enjoyed in the Soviet period. Tarasov suggests that as many 
young Russians became frustrated with the lack of opportunities which had previously been 
offered by institutions such as the Komsomol or the Young Pioneer Palaces, they searched 
for a scapegoat against which to vent their frustrations, and unable to touch this new 
generation of privileged Russians with their private security and bodyguards, they turned to 
foreigners as an easy target.20 
 As well as being strongly influenced by the attitudes of their friends and family, a 
broader top-down political influence can be clearly observed impacting on the beliefs and 
values of skinheads.  The 1990s were filled with turmoil and violence; a massive rise in crime 
and corruption was a distinctive characteristic of the Yeltsin years. This violence even 
reached the highest levels of the state, evidence of which was the bloody storming of the 
White House in October 1993 which saw Yeltsin pitted against the Russian parliament in a 
struggle for power. An unanticipated result of this conflict was that by using force to defuse 
the situation, Yeltsin had endorsed violence as a way of getting things done, showing that 
‘violence is conclusive proof in any discussion’.21 Further endorsing the use of force and 
also increasing tensions between ethnic Russians and non-Russians, particularly Muslims 
from the southern regions of the Federation, the First Chechen War strongly influenced 
the nationalistic and racist attitudes of many Russians. The war and the xenophobic 
campaigns which accompanied it in Moscow greatly contributed to a rise in everyday racism 
in Russia.22 In Moscow the police began enforcing a kind of ethnic cleansing within the city; 
by routinely checking the documents, registration and residence permits of ‘suspicious’ 
looking people (in this instance meaning anyone who appeared like they may be from the 
Caucasus), the Moscow police were able to deport many immigrants and residents of 
southern Russia from the city, naming Moscow a territory of ‘special rule’.23  
 Omel’chenko and Garifzianova point to the Russian state as having a direct impact 
on the actions and beliefs of Russian skinheads, arguing that: 
 
                                                        
20 Tarasov, para. 57. 
21 Alexander Salagaev et al., ‘From Local to Global: The Transformation of Delinquent and Radical 
Communities in the Tatarstan Republic of Russia’ in Subcultures and New Religious Movements in Russia and East-
Central Europe, ed. by George McKay et al. (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2009) p.23. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid.  
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The strengthening of national patriotic attitudes as politicians search for a new national 
idea, calls for the revival of the former power of Russia and the construction of a 
centralised system of power also cannot but encourage the development of xenophobic 
attitudes especially among socially deprived young people.24  
 
They also add that within the low-trust environment which is prevalent in contemporary 
Russia, by having only one ultimate source of trust and authority, manifested in the 
president, ‘the potential sources of threat are immediately multiplied.’ 25  Despite the 
ambivalence of many skinheads towards politics and the government’s apparent crackdown 
on skinhead activity since 2008, there is evidence to suggest that the relationship between 
the state and skinhead activity is not as black and white as it may first appear. 
 Between 2010 and 2011, members of the extremist group, the Nationalist Socialist 
Organisation (NSO), were put on trial for 27 counts of murder, in which many of the 
victims were foreigners. During this trial it was discovered that the leader of the group, 
Maksim Bazilev, had 200 million roubles in his bank account, and other members of the 
group testified that they had been receiving 2500 roubles a month.26 During the trial Bazilev 
was found dead, having slit his wrists in his cell at the secure headquarters of the Interior 
Ministry.27 Both of these facts roused suspicion that people with considerable money and 
power were somehow pulling the strings behind this organisation and were afraid of being 
caught.28 As Charles Clover acknowledges, it is highly unlikely that the true source of the 
money and the possible murderer of Bazilev will be discovered, but ‘the NSO has emerged 
not only as a terror group with a significant propaganda function, but most importantly, 
one with numerous and not altogether transparent relations with Russia’s political and law-
enforcement establishment.’29 
 Clover has not been the only journalist to accuse the Russian state of cooperating 
with skinheads. In the run up to the 2008 presidential elections, Mark Ames and Alexander 
Zaitchik raised the question of whether ‘the rise in skinhead violence is a strictly organic 
                                                        
24 Omel’chenko and Garifzianova, p.54.   
25 Ibid. pp.54-55. 
26 Charles Clover, ‘The Skinhead Terrorists’, The Financial Times, 3 December 2010, 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/21553438-fcda-11df-ae2d-00144feab49a.html#axzz3SffToQge> [accessed 
24 February 2015] (para. 9 of 50). 
27 Ibid., para.11. 
28 Ibid., paras. 12-14. 
29 Ibid., para. 16. 
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phenomenon or whether it is being manipulated or even encouraged from above.’30 On the 
other hand, the article also points to the government’s apparent attempts to deal with the 
problem of racially motivated violence, such as its passing of Article 232 which criminalises 
the incitement of ‘ethnic, racial or religious hatred’, highlighting the complexity of the issue, 
and stating that ‘the Kremlin has thus been working not simply to manipulate 
ultranationalism but also to control it, though its motivations are not always clear.’31  
 It is clear, then, that while nationalism became one of the keystones of the skinhead 
movement, the roots of this ideology are complicated and multifaceted. These attitudes are 
often passed down to individuals by parents and close acquaintances who have 
ultranationalistic or xenophobic views, a symptom of everyday racism in Russia. There is 
also reason to suspect that the state has played some role in spreading these views, even 
possibly highjacking ultranationalism and influencing the skinhead movement for its own 
purposes. It is also clear that the difficult social and economic situation that resulted from 
the troubles of the 1990s provided fuel for the fire, creating an environment of social 
friction, low trust and increasing racial intolerance, particularly Islamophobia following the 
First Chechen War. As Tarasov puts it, the rise of the Russian skinhead is a product of 
social rather than national change.32 The racist and nationalistic attitudes of skinheads seem 
to be symptomatic of a wider trend happening within Russian society as racial intolerance 
and nationalism increase their presence and influence.  The state’s relationship with this 
kind of nationalism remains one of the most difficult aspects of this phenomenon to 
understand, and will be addressed further in the final chapter. In the following chapter the 
political youth movement Nashi shall be discussed, looking at the roots of nationalism 
within the organisation and the impact it has had on spreading it to a broader section of 
Russia’s youth. 
II. NASHI, 2005-2012 
Within the political youth movement Nashi (ours) it has been possible to observe a form of 
state-endorsed nationalism. Whereas the Russian skinhead movement may often have 
                                                        
30 Mark Ames and Alexander Zaitchik, ‘Skinhead Violence Rising in Russia’, The Nation, 29 August 2007, 
<http://www.thenation.com/article/skinhead-violence-rising-russia> [accessed 25 February 2015] (para. 7 
of 18). 
31 Ibid., para. 16.  
32 Tarasov, para. 57. 
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appeared to be indifferent towards politics, groups such as Nashi ‘constitute a real political 
force, which can be used by political parties and individual politicians to achieve their 
goals.’33 Nashi was first founded in 2005 with backing from the Kremlin to ‘comprise a new 
political force,’ and its initial goals were ‘(1) to promote Russia’s global leadership in the 
21st century, (2) to prepare a ‘revolution of cadres’ in Russia, (3) to educate a new generation 
of state officials, and (4) to oppose the threat of an ‘orange-revolution’ in Russia’ as well as 
large amounts of anti-fascist campaigning.34 The group presented a considerable social and 
political force, having more than 300,000 members at the peak of its popularity between 
2007 and 2008.35 The group formally closed in 2012, though various sources at the time 
reported that the future of the group was uncertain.36 Some subsidiaries of the organisation, 
including the group StopHam (stop a lout), remain active at the time of writing.37 Given the 
immense popularity it held, it is important to analyse the root causes of the rise of 
nationalism within the group, and also asses to what extent Nashi contributed to the general 
rise of nationalistic and xenophobic attitudes in modern Russia up until 2012. 
 In many of its brochures and in its manifesto, Nashi took a strong stance against 
radical nationalism; for example, it has attacked Dmitry Rogozin, formerly the head of now 
defunct radical nationalist party Rodina (Motherland).38 Their manifesto stated that: 
 
Cultural diversity is Russia’s greatest asset in the modern world. Religious and ethnic 
cooperation empowers our country to develop further... Our generation’s task is to 
prevent the spread of fascist ideas, aggressive nationalism, religious intolerance and 
separatism that threatens the unity and territorial integrity of Russia.39 
 
                                                        
33 Oleg Belov, ‘Nashi versus Nazi: anti-fascist activity as a means of mass youth mobilisation in 
contemporary Russia’, trans. by Dmitry Borodin, Anthropology of East Europe Review, 26.2 (2008) 
<http://scholarworks.iu.edu/journals/index.php/aeer/article/view/424/499> [accessed 28 March 2015] 
(p.48). 
34 Ibid. 
35 Maya Atwal, ‘Evaluating Nashi’s Sustainability: Autonomy, Agency and Activism’, Europe-Asia Studies, 61.5 
(2009) <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09668130902904878> [accessed 28 March 2015] 
(p.743). 
36 Olga Kuzmenkova and Ekaterina Vinokurova, ‘Nashikh zakryvayut’, Gazeta.ru, 6 April 2012, 
<http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2012/04/06_a_4151693.shtml> [accessed 19 April 2015] (paras. 1-2 of 
22). 
37 Evgeny Shipilov, ‘Nakhamili na ugolovnoye delo’, Gazeta.ru, 3 May 2012, 
<http://www.gazeta.ru/auto/2012/05/03_a_4571421.shtml> [accessed on 21 April 2015] (para. 1 of 14). 
38 Belov, p.50. 
39 Nashi, as cited by Maya Atwal and Edwin Bacon, ‘The youth movement Nashi: contentious politics, civil 
society and party politics’, East European Politics, 28.3 (2012) 
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/21599165.2012.691424> [accessed on March 2015] 
(p.261). 
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This belief is reflected in some of their actions, for example in 2009 ‘around 30,000 young 
Russians came together in Moscow for Nashi’s “Russian March” in defiance of right-wing 
and extreme nationalist organisations marching under the same banner elsewhere in 
Moscow.’40 Nationalist figures were often labelled as fascists by the group, though as Oleg 
Belov notes from his interactions with members of Nashi, many of them were unable to 
distinguish between radical nationalism and fascism.41 Despite this anti-fascist and anti-
nationalist rhetoric, ‘its critics have compared it to radical far-right groups and at times 
referred to is as a fascist group itself.’42 This is due to the fact that ‘Nashi’s apparent efforts 
to quell radicalism and extremism sit uneasily alongside attempts to deliberately play on 
nationalistic sentiment in order to attract and inspire young Russians to its cause.’43 In 2007 
Nashi worked together with United Russia’s youth wing, Molodaya Gvardia (Young Gard), to 
combat dissenters’ marches. They used the slogan ‘“Russian for the Russians”, which, 
although representing the movements’ desire to keep out foreign influence on Russian 
politics and to associate the opposition marches with Western sponsorship, is also a slogan 
employed by far-right groups.’44 This is an example of how, in some instances, Nashi seems 
to encourage far-right nationalism rather than quell it. Maya Atwal and Edwin Bacon 
suggest a convincing explanation for Nashi’s flirtation with nationalism; due to the fact that 
nationalistic and xenophobic attitudes have been on the rise in Russia throughout the 1990s 
and 2000s, the Kremlin has been faced with the danger of extreme nationalism growing 
outside of its control, and as a result Nashi was tasked with co-opting these young 
nationalists in order to have some degree of control or influence over them.45 
 The strong line which Nashi took against foreign influence upon Russian matters 
impacted on the rise of nationalism amongst young Russians. In 2006 the British 
ambassador to Moscow, Anthony Brenton, attended a conference of Russian opposition 
parties, but following the event was consistently harassed by members of Nashi.46 They 
stalked Brenton for months, calling for him to apologise for the meeting.47 Disapproval of 
foreign influence was characteristic of Nashi’s ideology and identity, and as Atwal notes, for 
                                                        
40 Atwal and Bacon, p.261. 
41 Belov, p.50. 
42 Atwal and Bacon, p.261. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., p.262. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Arkady Ostrovskyin, ‘Youth group hounds UK Moscow ambassador’, Financial Times, Decemer 8 2006, 
<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/15054982-8661-11db-86d5-0000779e2340.html#axzz3VfrSgTBN> 
[accessed 28 March 2015] (para. 6 of 19). 
47 Ibid., (para. 4). 
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those who approved of the group it simply represented ‘a defensive strategy adopted in 
response to external threats to the beleaguered Russian nation.’48 The ultimate enemy of 
Nashi was ‘the loosely identified external threat of a Western-sponsored “liberal-fascist 
alliance” which is against a strong, autonomous Russia.’49 Indeed, in Nashi’s manifesto it 
was written that: 
 
Only by spreading our ideological influence over the younger generation can we prevent 
young people from being drawn into extremist organisations of a fascist and liberal 
tendency [...] The war on fascism is part of the fight for Russia’s integrity and 
sovereignty.50  
 
Here we see all of Nashi’s traditional enemies mixed together, and whilst promoting inter-
ethnic tolerance, at the same time it actively denounces foreign influence.51 The fight against 
extremism and foreign influence is equated with guarding Russia’s own integrity and 
sovereignty, and such rhetoric describing Russia as the victim of external enemies can only 
help feed nationalistic attitudes and foster negative attitudes towards foreigners, fitting in 
with Nashi’s apparent ‘nationalist-patriotic agenda.’52 Demonstrating that Russia is a victim 
of oppressive external powers is a powerful device that has been used at various points 
throughout Russian history to help create national solidarity, and on which nationalism can 
be built, ‘by instilling the sense of unity through emphasizing common suffering of the 
Russian nation.’53 
 Nashi enjoyed great support from United Russia and Putin’s government. As a 
result, the group received considerable Western media attention, and many writers saw 
Nashi as a tool of the regime. For example, Steven Lee Myers at the New York Times 
commented on the group saying that their purpose ‘is the ideological cultivation- some say 
                                                        
48 Atwal, p.746. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Nashi, as cited by Atwal and Bacon, p.261. 
51 Atwal and Bacon, p.261. 
52 Julie Hemment, ‘Soviet-Style Neoliberalism? Nashi, Youth Voluntarism, and the Reconstructing of Social 
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indoctrination - of today’s youth, the first generation to come of age in post-Soviet Russia.’54 
The role of the government in driving the beliefs and actions of Nashi cannot be ignored, 
the group had been so closely tied to Putin’s regime that it has been likened by observers 
to Putin’s own form of the Hitler Youth.55 Given Putin’s own relationship with nationalism, 
which is at times as hard to understand as Nashi’s, it is easier to explain some of the group’s 
actions. Since the earliest days of his presidency, particularly during his 2007-2008 election 
campaign, Putin has argued ‘that the precondition of Russia’s recovery was that Russians 
take pride in their nation.’56 Such rhetoric has a clear nationalistic sentiment, yet throughout 
his presidency Putin has decried nationalism, whilst instead promoting patriotism. 
Nationalism is defined as ‘systematically extremist, while any moderate expression of 
national sentiment made under the label of patriotism is considered not only respectable, 
but also necessary.’57 Putin and United Russia’s control over the patriotic label is what gives 
them the ability to name any opposition as either ‘traitors to the nation’ or ‘nationalist 
extremists.’58  
 When noting that the Kremlin itself has been using nationalistic rhetoric, whilst at 
the same time denouncing nationalism as ‘extremism’, it is possible to observe close 
similarities to Nashi’s own conflicted approach to nationalism. Many of Nashi’s activities 
were social projects, with a particular focus on supporting and caring for military veterans.59 
As Julie Hemment notes, ‘many of its campaigns have a strong nationalist-patriotic element, 
and many involve honoring Soviet history, specifically the Great Patriotic War.’ 60  In 
addition, those who attended Nashi camps could go to lectures ‘given by nationalist scholars 
and publicists.’61 This certainly seems to be a form of ‘ideological cultivation’, as suggested 
by Myers.62 Nationalistic, or patriotic ideology was manifested in their actions, be that 
harassing ambassadors or focussing their attention on war veterans who are valued for 
having defended the motherland. These factors can partially account for the rise in 
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nationalism amongst Russian youth, as many of the actions that members of Nashi took 
part in seem to have had some sort of nationalistic-patriotic ideology underpinning them, 
passed down from United Russia. 
 In conclusion, Nashi formally stood strongly against far right nationalism whilst 
acknowledging Russia’s cultural diversity as one of its greatest strengths. Yet despite this, 
the group promoted a nationalist-patriotic ideology, using it as an instrument for attracting 
young people to sign up. As Atwal and Bacon note, ‘Nashi taps into and cultivates 
nationalism, despite the danger that it acknowledges chauvinism among youth to present to 
Russia.’63 It seems that Nashi turned to nationalism due to the changing attitudes in Russian 
society as nationalistic and xenophobic attitudes became more prevalent. Though it could 
be argued that the group was simply another manifestation of the changes in attitudes of 
Russians in post-Soviet society, the manner in which Nashi interacted and used far-right 
nationalism directly contributed to the rise of nationalism amongst young Russians. Due to 
their proximity, the role of the state in determining the actions of Nashi also cannot be 
ignored given the government’s own complicated relationship with Russian nationalism. 
What can be concluded is that Nashi certainly had an impact on the spread of Russian 
nationalism amongst Russian youth; it did this by spreading negative views towards 
foreigners and foreign influence amongst its members, and also by organising special 
activities for its members with the purpose of ideological indoctrination. One of the clearest 
examples of its role in the rise of far-right nationalism amongst young Russians is the 
cooperation which the group had with skinheads, a topic which will be addressed in the 
following chapter as I compare the two groups and look at the changing role of the skinhead 
movement. 
III. COMPARISONS 
The previous two chapters have dealt with the skinhead movement and Nashi separately, 
analysing each of their relationships to nationalism independently of one another. In this 
chapter the skinhead movement and Nashi shall be compared and contrasted, looking at 
dissimilarities and similarities between the ideologies and actions of the two groups. In this 
respect collaboration between Nashi and the skinhead movement will be addressed, 
exemplifying the contribution of both groups to the rise of nationalism amongst young 
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Russians whilst demonstrating the closeness of the two groups. Following on from this, it 
will be shown that in recent years the skinhead movement has come to play an increasingly 
political role in Russian society, similar to that of Nashi. It will be argued that the skinhead 
movement has become an active contributor to the rise of far-right nationalism amongst 
Russian youth, rather than being simply symptomatic of a wider societal trend as it once 
was. With respect to this trend, it will also be mentioned that the Russian government paved 
the way for this shift within the Russian skinhead movement.  
 On the face of things, the skinhead movement and Nashi seem to greatly differ in 
their ideological approach to Russian nationalism. Skinheads are typically more distinctly 
far-right wing; in a study of a group of skinheads in the town of Vorkuta in the Komi 
Republic, for example, Pilkington found that the skinhead ideology was based upon racist 
and or neo-fascist views, if not both, which were underpinned by the ideologies of white 
supremacism, neo-Nazism and ‘a central palingenetic myth that lies at the core of fascism.’64 
Nashi’s own brand of nationalism seems far less extreme, given the fact that the group 
formally opposed far-right nationalism and extremism of any kind. Nonetheless, Nashi was 
content to use nationalism as a tool for recruiting more young people to its ranks, something 
which ‘sits uneasily’ next to its attempts to allegedly temper extremism. 65  Ultimately, 
however, it appears that Nashi clearly had an impact on the rise of nationalism amongst 
Russia’s youth, possessing the motive of controlling and co-opting nationalists into its ranks 
as a result of the upsurge in popularity of nationalism throughout Russian society. On the 
other hand, the skinhead movement, for much of its existence, seems to have been more 
symptomatic of a general trend underway throughout Russian society – an extreme example 
of the rise of nationalism and xenophobia in Russia, but not necessarily a group that has 
been actively spreading its message in the same way as Nashi.  
 However, despite their apparent differences, at one of Nashi’s early conferences 
Vasily Yakemenko, the founder of Nashi, encouraged the recruitment of skinheads into the 
group on the grounds of them being fellow Russian patriots.66 In 2006, Gazeta.ru reported 
that prominent members of Nashi had been at the head of different football clubs’ 
supporters’ groups with connections to skinheads and football hooligans, such as Nashi 
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organiser Aleksei Mitryushin, who had been in charge of CSKA Moscow fan club Gallant 
Steeds.67  Skinheads have also been actively brought into the group to work as its security 
force.68 In addition, there have been claims from various associations for the defence of 
human rights which have stated that Nashi has participated in ‘training skinheads for attacks 
in Tsaritsyno’.69  Such activities, of course, seem to contravene Nashi’s mission statement 
which takes a strong position against far-right nationalism, but by working together with 
such groups it can be argued that Nashi cannot help but endorse far-right nationalism, and 
as a result, create room for those with more extreme views to influence the politics and 
ideology of Nashi, particularly in the case of those who held considerable influence over the 
group, such as Mitryushin. 
 Despite the origins of the skinhead movement being formed around young Russians 
who were responding negatively to an increasingly difficult living situations, Peter Worger 
argues that: 
 
In recent years, the Russian skinhead movement, once consisting only of groups of 
marginalized youth acting out adolescent aggression, has grown to become part of a 
right-wing populist movement in the country and has imbued mainstream political 
discourse with an increasingly racist and xenophobic tinge.70  
 
The growing influence of skinhead groups cannot be ignored, as even though they might 
lack the organisational structure of Nashi, their impact on society is increasingly large. It is 
important to note that as the skinheads’ attitudes towards foreigners do not necessarily 
differ from those of many ordinary Russian citizens, the movement is representative of a 
considerable portion of the general public in Russia. What can be observed is that, similarly 
to how Nashi vied for further support, ‘the undercurrent of nationalism and xenophobia in 
both state and skinhead ideology, misunderstood and underestimated for so long, has 
become an issue that both state and alternative political parties use to capture the attention 
of a xenophobic Russian populace.’71 As demonstrated, skinheads often worked together 
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with Nashi, using the main resource at their disposal, violence, which ‘is the central method 
by which skinheads express themselves and their beliefs.’ 72 Worger asserts that as the 
skinhead movement became more political it began directing this violence not only towards 
immigrants, but also against other groups which stood against its ideology.73 The group 
seems to have acquired a more political motivation behind many of its actions, as 
demonstrated through its cooperation with Nashi. In addition, the use of some elements of 
far-right skinhead ideology by the state has served to further politicise the issues of 
nationalism and xenophobia. As such, the skinhead ideology has begun to have a more 
direct impact on the rise and spread of nationalism amongst a broader spectrum of young 
Russians through Nashi’s cooperation with the group and the government’s use of elements 
of this far-right ideology. 
 The Russian government has played a central role in the increased politicisation of 
the skinhead movement. Mihai Varga suggests that the government has contributed to the 
rise in far-right nationalism in three distinct ways. The first of these is the failure on the part 
of the Russian government to enforce the law against far-right violence; Varga notes that 
despite the high level of arrests made against far-right extremists, including skinheads, 
‘authorities often give perpetrators conditional sentences only, and they prosecute and 
convict only a few perpetrators in Moscow and St Petersburg where more than half of the 
country’s far-right attacks are committed.’ 74  He also notes that often the authorities 
sympathise with the actions of the perpetrators.75 The second cause which Varga identifies 
is the failure on the part of the authorities to punish instigators of hate crimes, particularly 
when they are formal organisations.76 The third and final cause is the collaboration between 
government organisations and skinheads, and in this respect he highlights Nashi as a 
particularly good example, saying that ‘activities of organisations created by the government 
that allow dialogue with right-wing extremists, show that in principle the government does 
not consider right-wing violence a problem.’77 All of these factors contribute to what nears 
endorsement of far-right actions, though as Varga notes: 
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The state and the party of power in Russia probably did not intend to directly support 
far-right organisations in their actions. Instead, what created state-induced opportunities 
of far-right actions was the ideological closeness of the party in power to the positions 
of the far right; the difference is that the government prefers other methods of fighting 
“illegal immigration” and follows direct objectives.78  
 
Despite this, what can be observed is that the government has allowed for the skinhead 
movement to take on an more political role, increasing its similarities to political youth 
movements such as Nashi. By allowing Nashi to work together with skinheads for the 
realisation of common goals, similarities between the two groups could only grow. Though 
Varga suggests that the Russian government may not have intended to directly support far-
right groups in such a manner, there was evidence to suggest otherwise. For example, Vasily 
Yakemenko, founder of Nashi and who encouraged the recruitment of skinheads into the 
organisation, was made the head of the Federal Youth Agency in 2007, indicative of his 
proximity to the Russian government.79 Worger also argues that due to the activities of 
disinterested and corrupt government officials who have not cracked down on the skinhead 
movement, ‘the two groups often overlap and as the skinhead movement blurs into 
mainstream culture so too may the ultra-right into mainstream politics.’80 On the subject of 
the the increasingly close relationship between the Russian government and skinheads, it is 
noted by Clover that: 
 
Gangs of skinheads and football fans have in recent years become the nucleus for a 
Kremlin-backed political movement designed to control the streets and prevent a 
confrontation with democratic political forces in the wake of the “Rose” and “Orange” 
revolutions in George and Ukraine- which saw democratic movements sweep 
entrenched regimes from power almost effortlessly.81 
 
Such a description of the skinhead movement is very similar to ones previously given for 
Nashi, which was often described by Western observers as a group used by the Kremlin to 
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counteract ‘street politics’ which became increasingly common in the 2000s as opposition 
groups went out onto the streets ‘to engage in contentious activity.’ 82  This further 
demonstrates how the role of the skinhead movement has become increasingly similar to 
that of Nashi, and it seems that the Russian government is directly supporting this shift. 
This overlap between the skinhead movement and the Russian government can also offer 
a possible explanation to the curious case of Maxim Bazilev, the former head of the NSO, 
mentioned in the first chapter. The possibility of such direct cooperation between the 
Russian government and organisations as extreme as the NSO is a worrying possibility, but 
some of the actions of the Russian government, seemingly supporting and allowing space 
for these groups to develop, have given some credence to this theory.  
 In conclusion, it seems that in recent years the role of the skinhead movement has 
become increasingly similar to that of Nashi. It now represents a palpable political force 
which is actively contributing to the spread of nationalism amongst Russia’s youth. 
Cooperation between the skinhead movement and Nashi is one particular example of the 
changing role of the skinhead movement, not only providing muscle for Nashi, but people 
with direct connections to the skinhead movement have gained high positions in Nashi’s 
organisational structure. Varga demonstrates that the lenience on the part of the 
government has also allowed the skinhead movement to become more influential. As well 
as this, the Russian government itself has used far-right rhetoric to appeal to an increasingly 
nationalistic and xenophobic Russian population, demonstrating the spread of the skinhead 
ideology into Russian politics. As the skinhead movement has recently played an 
increasingly similar role to that of Nashi, for example by taking part in ‘street politics’ for 
the benefit of the Kremlin, the potential influence of the group over Russia’s youth has only 
extended. 
CONCLUSION 
The Russian skinhead movement began as various groups of teenagers reacting to the 
difficulties of living in post-Soviet society. The rise of nationalism amongst these young 
people was, to a great extent, prompted by the attitudes of those around them, a result of 
the everyday racism which is so common in contemporary Russia. Despite this, it is 
important to note that since its beginnings the skinhead movement has not been solely 
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nationalistic. In their strongly negative views on homosexuals and different western 
subcultures, it is possible to observe a distaste for anything that is perceived as unusual or 
different. Despite this, nationalism and xenophobia are central to the skinhead movement 
and, in many ways, the skinhead movement is representative of a larger phenomenon, an 
extreme manifestation of the nationwide rise in far-right attitudes in the post-Soviet period. 
Viewed in this way, it seems that skinheads were a symptom of a broader phenomenon 
rather than a cause of it. The ultimate causes of the general rise in nationalistic and 
xenophobic views were ones that affected Russian society as a whole, such as the economic 
crisis in the 1990s and the wave of propaganda which accompanied the Chechen Wars. 
 Nashi, however, played a much more direct role in the rise of nationalism amongst 
Russian youth. Despite its formal position, which stands strongly against far-right 
nationalism or extremism of any kind, Nashi has evolved into a distinctly nationalistic 
organisation. The group appealed to the ever increasing nationalistic portion of Russia’s 
youth, attempting to control and manage it. Consequentially, it seems that Nashi has only 
served to disseminate nationalism further amongst young Russians rather than to quell it. 
Although it could be argued that the increased use of nationalism by Nashi is also simply 
symptomatic of wider trends underway throughout Russian society, the way in which Nashi 
has directly and consciously interacted with nationalism suggests that the group has very 
actively contributed to the overall rise of far-right attitudes amongst young Russians. 
 Despite the apparent differences between the skinheads and Nashi, more recently 
the skinhead movement has become conspicuously political. Through cooperation with this 
far-right movement, Nashi and Putin’s government could not help but endorse extreme 
nationalism and allow for such an ideology to impact their own organisations. The actions 
of the Russian government have served to allow the skinhead movement to further its 
cause; as a result of not cracking down on the movement, its influence has only grown. 
There is also evidence to suggest that connections exist between the Russian skinhead 
movement and individuals who wield considerable power and influence, as demonstrated 
through the case of the mysterious death of Maksim Bazilev. What can be concluded is that 
through its increasingly political role, the skinhead movement has come to more closely 
reflect Nashi as an active contributor to the rise of nationalism amongst young Russians.  
 To conclude, both the Russian skinhead movement and Nashi have greatly 
contributed to the rise of Russian nationalism. Following the upsurge in nationalistic and 
xenophobic attitudes amongst the Russian population, both the skinhead movement and 
Nashi embraced nationalism as distinct parts of their political agendas by actively spreading 
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the ideology amongst Russia’s youth, particularly in the Putin period. The Russian 
government has also played a substantial role in the rise of nationalism; given the 
cooperation between skinheads and Nashi, it appears that the Russian government has not 
only allowed, but encouraged, both groups to further spread nationalism amongst Russia’s 
younger generations. The rise of far-right nationalism amongst this section of the Russian 
population will ultimately present challenges for the future of the multiethnic and 
multicultural Russian nation. For future academics it will become increasingly important to 
observe the impact these generations have on those younger them, and the direction that 
the Russian nation takes in the long run as members of today’s youth begin to take positions 
of power and influence in Russian society.  
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